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The role of the exchange rate and the exchange rate regime in the monetary policy 
decision-making process in Colombia is described. The rationale for the 
intervention of the Central Bank in the FX market is explained and the experience 
in this regard is reviewed. Special attention is given to the seemingly varying 
effectiveness of different types of intervention and to the challenges posed by the 
sterilization of purchases of foreign currency. The exchange rate regime, FX 
regulation and FX policy determine the resilience of the economy in the face of 
external shocks and allow for the possibility of countercyclical monetary policy 
responses. A virtuous circle is created in which the volatility present in a flexible 
exchange rate regime improves the conditions for the functioning of a flexible 
exchange rate regime. 
 





Esta nota describe el papel de la tasa de cambio y del régimen cambiario en la 
formulación de la política monetaria en Colombia. Asimismo explica la lógica de la 
intervención cambiaria del Banco de la República y repasa la experiencia de los 
últimos años en este aspecto. Se estudian las aparentes diferencias en la 
efectividad de distintos tipos de intervención cambiaria y los retos que implica la 
esterilización de dicha intervención. El régimen de tasa de cambio, la regulación y 
la política cambiaria determinan la reacción de la economía ante choques externos 
y posibilitan respuestas de política monetarias contra-cíclicas. En particular, se 
genera un círculo virtuoso en el cual la volatilidad cambiaria presente en un 
régimen flexible mejora las condiciones para el funcionamiento adecuado del 
propio régimen de tasa de cambio flexible. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The  monetary  policy  framework  in  Colombia  is  based  on  an  extended  Inflation  Targeting 
strategy that aims at maintaining a low and stable inflation rate, stabilizing output around its 
natural level and contributing to the preservation of financial stability. The latter objective is 
shared with other state agencies and implies a close monitoring of and occasional policy 
responses to the movements of financial variables. Since there is no explicit or implicit target 
on the nominal or real exchange rate and the instrumentation of monetary policy relies mostly 
on changes of the short term interest rate, a substantial degree of exchange rate flexibility is 
required and allowed. "Impossible Trinity" considerations in an economy with a relatively open 
capital account make any other setting unfeasible over the medium and long run. 
 
In  this  context,  the  exchange  rate  embodies  one  of  the  most  relevant  channels  of 
transmission of monetary policy in an open economy like Colombia’s. It is also a key asset 
price  that  is  closely  related  to  other  local  asset  prices  and  weights  on  private  agents´ 
decisions on the currency composition of their balance sheets. As such, the exchange rate 
greatly influences the implementation and the impact of monetary policy. This note describes 
the role of the exchange rate and the exchange rate regime in the monetary policy decision-
making process and in the response of the economy and the Central Bank to external shocks.  
 
Even under the extended IT framework with a flexible exchange rate regime, the Central Bank 
of  Colombia  has  significantly  intervened  in  the  FX  market.  This  note  also  explains  the 
rationale for this intervention and describes the experience of Colombia in this regard. Special 
attention is given to the seemingly varying effectiveness of different types of intervention and 
to the challenges posed by the sterilization of purchases of foreign currency. 
 
2. The Exchange Rate in the Implementation of Monetary Policy 
 
The IT strategy posits that the path of monetary policy instruments must be determined by the 
forecast evolution of macro variables like inflation or output. To build such forecasts for an 
open economy, it is crucial to have an idea about the future behavior of the exchange rate. 
This in turn needs an assumption or model about the long run equilibrium exchange rate and 
their determinants. Usually models incorporate a version of the UIP condition, which relates 
the nominal exchange rate to current and future domestic and foreign monetary policy stance 
and to a long run equilibrium level of the exchange rate. Hence, the very functioning of the IT 
strategy  in  an  open  economy  is based on a  notion  of  an equilibrium  real exchange  rate. 
Different assumptions (or models) in this respect could imply different paths for the policy 
interest rate.  
 
In practice, the Central Bank informs its models and its thinking in this regard through medium 
and  long  term  balance  of  payments  forecasts  that  capture  the  main  fundamental  factors 
behind the trends of the real exchange rate and the current account balance (terms of trade, 
external demand, FDI and other capital flows etc.) In the DSGE model the evolution of net 
foreign assets determines sovereign risk premium and affects the real exchange rate. 
 
As previously mentioned, the exchange rate represents one of the most important channels of 
transmission of monetary policy in an open economy. As such, the Central Bank’s models, 
diagnostics  and  forecasts  emphasize  the  effect  of  shocks  and  policy  responses  on  the 
exchange  rate  and,  through  it,  on  inflation  and  output.  Considerable  effort  is  devoted  to   2 
understand the behavior of the FX market in order to extract information on the size and 
duration of shocks. This is routinely integrated in the inflation forecast rounds to generate 
scenarios and derive monetary policy implications. 
 
3. Exchange Rate Volatility, FX Regulation and the Policy Response to Shocks. 
 
A key issue regarding the exchange rate in the monetary policy framework in Colombia is the 
set of conditions that allow the exchange rate to work as a shock absorber. As in other open 
emerging economies, in Colombia the bulk of shocks are real, not nominal. Thus, a flexible 
exchange rate regime is appropriate to stabilize the economy in the face of those shocks, 
especially in the context of rigid formal labor markets. Importantly, a flexible exchange rate 
regime is necessary for a countercyclical monetary policy response to the shocks. Therefore, 
ensuring the conditions for a flexible exchange rate is crucial. 
 
Among  those  conditions,  two  deserve  special  attention.  One  is  the  absence  of  sizable 
currency  and  FX  liquidity  mismatches.  This  is  important  because  it  implies  that  large 
exchange rate adjustments are possible without the risk of bankruptcies, pronounced drops in 
aggregate  demand  or  strong  pressures  on  the  currency  and  the  international  reserves. 
Otherwise, a shock, say to the sovereign risk premium, would require a pro-cyclical monetary 
policy  response  (an  increase  in  local  interest  rates)  to  prevent  a  sharp  depreciation.  The 
financial  fragility  of  the  economy  is  therefore  exacerbated  in  the  presence  of  currency 
mismatches and this not only increases the risk of financial instability, but also constrains the 
set of policy options available to deal with the shock. 
 
The  second  condition  is  the  absence  of  a  large  pass-through  from  the  exchange  rate  to 
domestic prices. This is important again because it allows a large adjustment of the exchange 
rate after an external shock without the risk of a substantial spike in inflation. Hence, it also 
avoids a pro-cyclical monetary policy response. 
 
In  contrast  to  the  past  and  particularly  to  the  nineties,  throughout  the  last  decade  the 
abovementioned  conditions  were  attained  in  Colombia,  allowing  for  a  countercyclical 
monetary policy and a less disruptive adjustment of the economy after the global financial 
crisis.  At  the  root  of  this  achievement  lie  three  factors.  First,  the  permanent  reduction  of 
inflation after 1999 and the meeting of low and declining inflation targets since then prompted 
a fall in the pass-through coefficient (Graph 1)
1. According to Taylor (2000), in a high inflation 
regime,  movements  of  the  nominal  exchange  rate  signal  permanent  nominal  shifts  that 
influence future marginal costs expected by firms that have market power and are subject to 
price rigidities. In this environment, the transmission of movements of the exchange rate to 
domestic prices is large. On the other hand, when inflation is low and credible, the response 
of local prices to the exchange rate is more subdued, because the changes to the latter do 
not signal significant effects on expected future marginal costs. 
                                                 
1 See Appendix 1 for a description of the variables.   3 
 
Graph 1 















































































































































































































































































































A second factor behind the emergence of favorable conditions for a floating exchange rate 
and countercyclical monetary policy is the increased volatility of the exchange rate after the 
abandonment  of  the  target  zone  in  1999.  This  has  reduced  the  pass-through  from  the 
exchange rate to local prices, again, as movements in the exchange rate are often temporary 
and  do  not  signal  persistent  changes  in  future  marginal  costs  (Graph  2)
  2.  Similarly,  the 
response of net exports to shifts in the real exchange rate may be more muted under higher 
exchange rate volatility, since movements in the value of the currency rarely signal persistent 
variations in external competitiveness (Graph 3)
 3. This means lower demand pressures on 
domestic inflation stemming from a real depreciation of the currency. 
                                                 
2 See Appendix 1 for a description of the variables. 
3 See Appendix 1 for a description of the variables.   4 
Graph 2 
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   5 
Moreover, a larger volatility of the exchange rate forces residents to internalize currency risk 
in their financing decisions and may have contributed to a decrease in currency mismatches 
(Graph 4)
4. Also, it has induced the development of the markets for hedging instruments, like 
the  FX  forward  market  in  Colombia  (Graph  5).  Overall,  exchange  rate  volatility  has 






















































































                                                 
4 Ize and Levy Yeyati (2003) show that financial dollarization of an economy depends on the relation 
between the volatility of inflation and the volatility of the real exchange rate. When inflation is volatile 
relative to the real exchange rate, both risk-averse creditors and debtors will increase the share of 
dollar-denominated  assets  and  liabilities  in  their  porfolios.  Hence,  financial  intermediaries  may  be 
matched, but borrowers may incur in large currency mismatches. 
   6 
 
Graph 5 
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FX regulation and FX policy measures are the third factor explaining the achievement of the 
conditions for exchange rate flexibility and countercyclical monetary policy. The maintenance 
of an adequate level of international reserves has reinforced the ability of the country to cope 
with external shocks and has prevented depreciation pressures derived from the perception of 
an  insufficient  cushion  of  international  liquidity.  Prudential  regulation  limiting  financial 
intermediaries’ currency and external liquidity mismatches has also improved the resilience of 
the financial system in the presence of large external shocks. Temporary capital controls (e.g. 
the  deposit  requirement  on  foreign  indebtedness)  have  played  a  role  too  in  supporting 
financial stability, so long as they increase the cost of external short term debt with respect to 
other  types  of  capital  inflows  with  better  risk  characteristics  (FDI,  long  term  debt  or 
movements of residents´ assets abroad).     
 
The best example of the benefits of the new regime is the behavior of the economy during the 
global financial crisis (October 2008-March 2009). Despite a large nominal depreciation of the 
Colombian peso (comparable to the fall of other currencies in Latin America), policy interest 
rates  were  rapidly  reduced  since  December  2008  (countercyclical  policy  response)  and 
intervention  of  the  Central  Bank  in  the  FX  or  foreign  currency  interbank  markets  was 






















Colombia -109 0 -109* 0 0 41,30%
Peru -4602 -4837 0 235 0 12,16%
Chile -1372 0 0 -1372 0 15,46%
Brazil** -2490 -3440 0 3483 -2532 48,38%
Mexico*** -21193 -21193 0 0 0 41,20%
Source: Central Banks' official web sites
* Volatilitily Options: Put Options - Call Options
** Includes data from January to March only
*** Amounts don't include purchases of USD 2152 Mill. made by CBM to Pemex
Foreign Exchange Market Intervention October 2008 - March 2009 (+Purchases-Sales)  7 
A  corollary  of  the  foregoing  argumentation  is  that  low  inflation  and  the  flexibility  of  the 
exchange  rate  favor  the  emergence  of  the  conditions  that  help  maintain  low  inflation, 
exchange  rate  flexibility,  countercyclical  policy  and  stable  output  after  shocks  hit  the 
economy.  Keeping  inflation  low  and  allowing  the  exchange  rate  to  fluctuate  generate  low 
pass-through  coefficients  and  small,  manageable  currency  mismatches  that  permit  an 
adjustment of the exchange rate and the adoption of countercyclical monetary policy, i.e. a 
virtuous circle. A simple model is presented in the Appendix 2 that illustrates this idea. 
 
 
4. FX Intervention: Rationale and Experience 
 
In Colombia the Central Bank has intervened in the FX market with three objectives: (i) to 
build up or sustain an adequate level of international reserves, (ii) to curb excessive volatility 
or to fix disorderly behavior of the market and (iii) to correct a misalignment of the exchange 
rate.  
 
As mentioned above, one of the reasons for the favorable adjustment of the economy to 
external shocks in recent years is the existence of sufficient buffers of international liquidity. 
Hence, the Central Bank continuously monitors international liquidity indicators to assess the 
need for additional purchases of international reserves. Traditional ratios of reserves to GDP, 
monetary  aggregates  and  imports,  and  variations  of  the  Guidotti-Greenspan  rule  are 
examined  through  time  and  in  relation  to  a  group  of  emerging  economies.  Occasionally, 
measures of optimal reserves are calculated and discussed.  
 
Since the adoption of a floating regime in 1999, the Central Bank has used an automatic 
mechanism to sell or purchase FX in order to control excessive volatility episodes. It consists 
of  auctions  of  put  (call)  options  to  buy  (sell)  US  Dollars  to  (from)  the  Central  Bank.  The 
auctions are triggered whenever the nominal exchange rate deviates from its 20-day average 
by more than a specified percentage. In recent years this mechanism was suspended when 
the Central Bank adopted measures to correct an overvaluation of the currency. It has been 
inactive since October 2009. 
 
Exchange  rate  misalignments  are  considered  harmful  because  they  cause  adverse, 
unsustainable effects on inflation (in the case of a depreciation) or on tradable output and 
employment  (in  the  case  of  an  appreciation).  In  addition,  currency  misalignments  are 
sometimes related to speculative behavior in other asset markets (e.g. public bond and stock 
markets) and, therefore, may feed into risks on financial stability.  
 
While countering an over or undervaluation of the currency may be deemed as convenient, 
there are no implicit or explicit targets for the nominal or real exchange rate. Throughout the 
seventies and eighties FX policy aimed at stabilizing the real exchange rate (RER). In the 
end, this objective could not be accomplished and, instead, inflation rose and became highly 
persistent, as monetary policy was accommodative of various shocks and indexation spread. 
It took the independent Central Bank more than eight years to drive inflation to single digits. 
So, a lesson was learned about the risks of real exchange rate targeting. In its communication 
strategy the Central Bank repeatedly emphasizes the idea that to persistently affect the RER, 
real (not nominal) instruments must be used, especially movements in aggregate saving.  
   8 
It is difficult to identify a misalignment of the exchange rate, as it is to detect any asset price 
bubble, while (sterilized) FX intervention is costly in fiscal and monetary terms. Hence, the 
decision to intervene to correct a presumed misalignment follows a careful examination of the 
costs  and  benefits  involved.  As  explained  previously,  the  Central  Bank  closely  tracks  the 
behavior of the FX market, monitoring the evolution of the flows and transactions in both its 
spot and forward components to form an idea about the short term exogenous developments 
affecting them. A weekly FX cash balance is analyzed in depth to identify changes in the size 
and nature of the flows. This is complemented with information coming from the derivative 
(forward) market to infer the movements of the FX exposure of residents and non-residents. 
 
In  addition,  the  behavior  of  the  Colombian  peso  is  frequently  compared  to  that  of  other 
emerging market currencies to control for global common factors, and significant differences 
are studied in some detail.  Furthermore, routinely the Central Bank produces estimates of 
long  run  or  "equilibrium"  exchange  rates  based  on  several  methodologies:  PPP, 
Tradable/Non-Tradable relative prices, BEER and FEER
5. Confidence intervals are calculated 
for each methodology. The probability of misalignment is assessed by examining the position 
of the current real or nominal exchange rate with respect to those confidence intervals. Most 
methodologies  are  computed  for a  PPI-based,  trade-weighted  RER  index,  but  other RER 
indices are carefully examined (e.g. CPI-based indices and indices of competitiveness in third 
markets). Appendix 3 describes the methodologies applied. The information derived from all 
these sources is used to judge the existence of a misalignment, which is, in turn, a key input 
in the FX intervention decision.  
 
All the FX intervention of the Central Bank is sterilized to the extent required to keep short 
term interest rates close to the policy interest rate. This means that not necessarily all the 
dollar purchases are sterilized, since part of them would be absorbed by the increases of 
money demand. The choice of sterilization mechanisms is not trivial and will be reviewed in 
the next section. 
 
The  form  of  the  intervention  is  a  key  decision  with  important  consequences  on  its 
effectiveness. For the purpose of accumulating reserves or curbing excessive volatility, rules-
based mechanisms were used since the inception of the floating regime in 1999. This choice 
was justified by the explicit purpose of not affecting the the trend of the exchange rate. In the 
cases  in  which  presumed  misalignments  were  dealt  with,  the  Colombian  experience  with 
different  types  of  intervention  is  rich.  Rules-based  intervention,  discretionary  intervention, 
verbal intervention and daily purchases of fixed amounts of US Dollars have been used in the 
past six years with varying degrees of success. 
 
The  empirical  evidence  in  this  regard  is  far  from  conclusive.  A  review  of  the  literature 
presented by Rincón and Toro (2010, p. 29) suggests in general a positive, small effect of the 
intervention  on  the  return  of  the  nominal exchange  rate  and  an ambiguous  impact  on  its 
volatility. However, many of those econometric estimations exhibit shortcomings
6. In an effort 
to comprehensively test for the effectiveness of intervention and capital controls, Rincón and 
Toro estimate more complete models of the return of the nominal exchange rate. They find no 
                                                 
5 BEER stands for Behavioral Equilibrium Exchange Rate. FEER stands for Fundamental Equilibrium Exchange Rate. See 
Appendix 2.  
6 Specifically, with respect to the correct distribution of the residuals, the measures of the intervention, the treatment of 
endogeneity issues and the interpretation of some results.   9 
significant effects of intervention in general, except when accompanied by capital controls. 
Both intervention and capital controls are found to increase exchange rate volatility. 
 
A  summary  of  the  experience  of  the  Central  Bank  with  FX  intervention  since  2004  is 
presented in Graph 5. It is clear that the large discretionary purchases of reserves of 2004-
2005 and, especially, 2007 seem to have been less effective than other forms of intervention. 
Indeed, throughout those years, the currency appreciated despite the intervention. In contrast, 
the  sub-periods  of  verbal intervention and daily  purchases  of fixed  amounts exhibit  some 






























Of course, a rigorous analysis must control for shifts in other determinants of the exchange 
rate.  However,  the  difference  in  the  reaction  of  the  currency  to  the  various  forms  of 
intervention is suggestive. In particular, the episodes of June 2008 and the last quarter of 
2009  are  worth  highlighting.  In  the  first  one,  the  value  of  the  Dollar  jumped  on  the 
announcement  of  the  program  of  daily  purchases  of  constant  amounts  of  US  Dollars. 
Afterwards, the Lehman crisis continued pushing down the currency.  
 
In the second episode (October-December 2009), the Central Bank announced that it would 
satisfy the increased demand for base money of the last quarter of the year either through the 
purchase of US Dollars or public bonds (TES). Information about the FX intervention was not 
disclosed until January 2010. The ambiguity created by the Central Bank seems to have had   10 
an  impact  on  the  exchange  rate,  as  illustrated  by  the  swift  correction  observed  after  the 
announcement. Interestingly, the Central Bank did not buy any US Dollars in that period. 
 
Two hypotheses can be advanced to explain the observed difference of responses of the 
exchange rate to the different types of intervention. First, discretionary intervention, especially 
when done in large amounts, may signal a defense of a particular level of the exchange rate 
and may induce additional capital inflows, spurred by the expectation of an appreciation of the 
currency. This was the case of 2007, when the large, discretionary FX intervention occurred 
in  a  period  of  tightening  monetary  policy.  Moreover,  large  interventions  may  indicate  a 
reduced ability to intervene in the future (because of cost or monetary considerations) and 
could exacerbate the expectations of an appreciation in the short run, thus inducing additional 
capital inflows. 
 
Second,  the  effectiveness  of  the  intervention  seems  to  be  influenced  by  the  level  of  the 
exchange rate at which it is implemented. The more effective interventions after 2008 have 
taken place at high values of the currency, in contrast to the intervention in 2004-2007, that 
was  undertaken  at  more  depreciated  levels  of  the  peso.  This  would  support  the 
aforementioned procedure by which a decision to intervene is based on some evidence of 
misalignment. 
 
5. Sterilization of FX intervention 
 
Over the last five years the stock of international reserves has grown faster than the base 
money demand (Table 2), thus the need for increased sterilization operations. Starting from a 
net creditor position with respect to the financial system, the Central Bank has sterilized the 
purchases of FX by adjusting its credit to financial institutions (Repos). It has also decreased 
its holdings of public debt bonds (TES) and mopped up liquidity through remunerated, non-
reserve  deposits  offered  to  financial  intermediaries  (other  non-monetary  liabilities). 
Government deposits at the Central Bank have remained an important sterilization instrument 
as well (Table 2).  
 
The choice of the sterilization mechanism is a complex one, since the alternatives available 
have different costs and risks that create trade-offs for the Central Bank. In Colombia this 
decision involves a regular benefit/cost  analysis in which the sterilization mechanisms are 
judged according to the following criteria: (i) Impact on capital flows, (ii) fiscal or quasi-fiscal 
costs, (iii) effects on financial intermediation, (iv) implications on the stance of monetary policy 
and (v) degree of control by the Central Bank. 
 
The sterilization instruments used or considered are the following: (i) Reductions of Repo and 
contraction through lower interest rate, “Lombard” facilities, (ii) remunerated, non-reserve 
deposits, (iii) Central Bank securities, (iv) Government deposits at the Central Bank, (v) Sales 
of Central Bank’s holdings of Government securities  and (vi) reserve requirements. 
 
Reductions in Repo operations have little impact on capital inflows because no new low risk 
peso liabilities are being issued. Their quasi-fiscal cost is given by the difference between the 
policy (short) interest rate and the return on international reserves. They are totally under the 
control of the Central Bank and, as long as the latter remain a net creditor of the financial 
system, do not change the stance of monetary policy. In this respect, a problem emerges 
when the sterilization of FX purchases forces the bank to become a net debtor of the financial   11 
system. In this case, the excess liquidity must be absorbed through a “Lombard” facility at the 
Central Bank that has associated an interest rate 100 bps. lower than the policy rate.  
 
Table 2 
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Billions of pesos
ASSETS 24.479          29.001          36.189          40.101          43.508          49.078         
International reserves 
2/ 19.010            20.932            30.775            36.470            39.439            44.283           
Repos 2.271              5.557              3.839              3.070              3.255              2.896             
Government securities - TES 3.198              2.512              1.575              561                  814                  1.900             
LIABILITIES 24.479          29.001          36.189          40.101          43.508          49.078         
Monetary Base 18.062            22.374            26.674            30.227            33.865            37.781           
Other non-monetary liabilities 
3/ -                  -                  955                  845                  1.513              1.098             
Government deposits 5.760              5.939              6.830              7.818              7.000              7.821             
Other net 658                  689                  1.730              1.211              1.130              2.378             
Percentage of the total assets
ASSETS 100               100               100               100               100               100              
International reserves 
2/ 78                    72                    85                    91                    91                    90                   
Repos 9                      19                    11                    8                      7                      6                     
Government securities - TES 13                    9                      4                      1                      2                      4                     
LIABILITIES 100               100               100               100               100               100              
Monetary Base 74                    77                    74                    75                    78                    77                   
Other non-monetary liabilities 
3/ -                  -                  3                      2                      3                      2                     
Government deposits 24                    20                    19                    19                    16                    16                   
Other net 3                      2                      5                      3                      3                      5                     
Absolute annual difference
ASSETS 6.742            4.522            7.188            3.912            3.408            5.570           
International reserves 
2/ 5.436              1.922              9.843              5.695              2.969              4.844             
Repos 67                    3.285              (1.717)             (770)                185                  (359)               
Government securities - TES 1.240              (685)                (938)                (1.014)             253                  1.085             
LIABILITIES 6.742            4.522            7.188            3.912            3.408            5.570           
Monetary Base 2.685              4.312              4.300              3.553              3.638              3.916             
Other non-monetary liabilities 
3/ (160)                -                  955                  (110)                668                  (415)               
Government deposits 3.772              179                  891                  988                  (817)                821                 
Other net 445                  31                    1.041              (519)                (81)                  1.248             
Annual growth rate
ASSETS 38,0              18,5              24,8              10,8              8,5                12,8             
International reserves 
2/ 40,0                10,1                47,0                18,5                8,1                   12,3               
Repos 3,0                   144,6              (30,9)               (20,0)               6,0                   (11,0)              
Government securities - TES 63,3                (21,4)               (37,3)               (64,4)               45,1                133,3             
LIABILITIES 38,0              18,5              24,8              10,8              8,5                12,8             
Monetary Base 17,5                23,9                19,2                13,3                12,0                11,6               
Other non-monetary liabilities 
3/ (100,0)             (11,5)               79,1                (27,4)              
Government deposits 189,8              3,1                   15,0                14,5                (10,5)               11,7               
Other net 208,7              4,7                   151,2              (30,0)               (6,7)                 110,4             
SOURCE: Banco de la República
1/ Yearly average of montly data
2/ It excludes the price effect (dollar-peso) of the international reserves
3/ It includes reverse repo and remunerated deposits of the financial system.







   12 
Hence, ceteris paribus, the transition from a net creditor to a net debtor position may affect 
the  stance  of  monetary  policy,  as  the  short  term  market  interest  rates  could  deviate 
(downwards) from the policy interest rate. In fact, some periods of a Central Bank’s net debtor 
position coincide with such a deviation (Graph 6). Also, the transmission of monetary policy 
may be weakened by a reduction in the net creditor position. Vargas et al (2010) show that 
the pass-through from policy rates to deposit rates and to some lending rates (prime and 
treasury loans) falls if the Central Bank has a net debtor position, especially when the policy 




Net credit position of the Banco de la República (NCP) and 
difference between interbank interest rate (TIB) and the 



























































































































































































































































































































































Source: Banco de la República
 
 
Remunerated, non-reserve deposits are used precisely when the Central Bank becomes net 
debtor of the financial system. They pay an interest rate that is close to the policy rate, so that 
monetary policy stance is not affected by sterilized intervention and their quasi-fiscal cost is 
similar to the cost of reducing Repos. The term of the deposits is a crucial parameter. If they 
are overnight, then control on policy stance is almost perfect, but they could attract large 
capital inflows when local short term interest rates are higher than foreign ones. After all, they 
do not have credit risk (they are peso liabilities of the Central Bank) nor liquidity and market 
risk (if overnight). Furthermore, if overnight deposits coexist with Repos, the interbank market 
will be severely hindered, as the incentives for banks to lend to each other are diminished. 
 
On the other hand, longer maturities may discourage capital inflows due to higher liquidity risk 
(deposits  are  not  tradable),  but  control  over  liquidity  is  weakened.  The  Central  Bank  has 
offered deposits with 7, 14, 30 and 60 day maturity, but only the 7 and 14 day deposits have 
been demanded. Thus, nothing guarantees that all the excess liquidity is actually mopped up 
and the stance of monetary policy, the inflation target or financial stability are put at risk, 
particularly when this situation is allowed to persist for an extended period of time. 
 
The issuance of (tradable) Central Bank securities could help fix the problem of illiquidity of 
remunerated  deposits,  but  may  attract  more  capital.  To  alleviate  this  situation,  securities   13 
would need to have relatively long maturities and, therefore, higher market risk. However, this 
would imply larger quasi-fiscal costs. Control on short term interest rates is not at risk in this 
case, but, depending on the amounts issued, the Central Bank operations could influence 
longer term rates.  Further, Central Bank paper may compete with Government securities, 
leading to coordination problems, distortion of the sovereign yield curve and higher costs of 
financing for the Government. In Colombia, a 2009 law authorized the Central Bank to issue 
its  own  bonds,  but  none  have  been  sold  so  far.  The  sale  of  Central  Bank  holdings  of 
Government securities has similar implications. However, unlike the issuance of Central Bank 
paper, the use of this instrument is limited by the initial size of the holdings. 
 
Government deposits at the Central Bank have allowed the latter to maintain a net creditor 
position with the financial system, thereby contributing to the sterilization of FX purchases by 
means  of  reductions  in  Repos.  The  Central  Government  is  committed  to  manage  all  its 
liquidity through Central Bank deposits that are paid an interest rate close to the policy rate. 
Nevertheless,  these  deposits  depend  on  the  Government  cash  flow  and  are  beyond  the 
control  of  the  Central  Bank.  As  a  result,  when  the  level of  international reserves  is high, 
fluctuations of these deposits may shift the position of the Central Bank from net creditor to 
net debtor of the financial system, or significantly increase a net debtor position, with all the 
difficulties that this change entails. 
 
Finally, increases in reserve requirements may be used to raise the demand for base money 
and absorb the monetary expansion resulting from FX intervention. In this case, quasi-fiscal 
costs are non-existent because they are passed to the financial system. The flipside is, of 
course, the distortion of financial intermediation and the rise in interest rate spreads, which, if 
long lasting, may be very costly or induce “innovations” to evade the reserve requirements. 
Those “innovations” may cause financial disintermediation and increase the risks on financial 
stability. In addition, the effects on the policy stance and the transmission of monetary policy 
are unclear (lending interest rates go up, but deposit rates may fall) and difficult to gauge. For 
the same reason, the impact of reserve requirements on capital inflows is also unclear. Higher 
lending rates may spur external borrowing by residents with access to foreign financing, but 
potentially lower deposit rates may discourage some inflows.  
 
All these considerations are taken into account when deciding on the sterilization mechanism 
to be used. The alternatives are evaluated according to the aforesaid criteria and their relative 




Exchange rate flexibility is a key feature of the extended IT monetary strategy in place in 
Colombia.  In  this  setting,  the  exchange  rate  works  as  a  shock  absorber,  a  transmission 
channel of monetary policy and a critical asset price. This means that the implementation of 
monetary policy requires a view on the long run trend and determinants of the RER. Also, the 
exchange rate regime, FX regulation and FX policy determine the resilience of the economy 
in the face of external shocks and allow for the possibility of countercyclical monetary policy 
responses. A virtuous circle is created in which the volatility present in a flexible exchange 
rate regime improves the conditions for the functioning of a flexible exchange rate regime. 
 
In spite of the flexible exchange rate, IT regime, the Central Bank has actively intervened in 
the FX market with the purpose of maintaining and adequate level of international reserves,   14 
curbing excessive volatility or disorderly behavior of the FX market, and countering exchange 
rate misalignments. A close monitoring and analysis of the FX market in the short run, as well 
as  a  set  of  long  run  or  “equilibrium”  RER  models  are  used  to  judge  the  probability  of  a 
misalignment. In this case, the type of intervention and the level of the exchange rate at which 
it is undertaken seem to be important determinants of its effectiveness. 
 
In the past five years international reserves have grown faster than money base demand, 
making sterilization of FX intervention a relevant issue for the Central Bank. The choice of 
sterilization instrument is guided by criteria related to the effects of the available mechanisms 
on the stance of monetary policy and monetary transmission, capital inflows and financial 
intermediation, as well as by their quasi-fiscal costs and control by the Central Bank. In this 
context, the transition from a net creditor position to a net debtor position of the Central Bank 
with respect of the financial system seems to have important consequences on the stance 
and transmission of monetary policy. 
 









  Pass-Through: 
 
A time-varying coefficient is estimated that measures the transmission from the exchange rate 
to local tradable-good prices. The estimation used quarterly data from 1989-III to 2010-III and 




 is the annualized quarterly tradable good inflation,    is a measure of external inflation,   
is the nominal depreciation of  the Colombian peso, 
is the annualized quarterly tradable good inflation,  
 is the long run real depreciation of the 




is a measure of annual inflation expectations. 
The time-varying parameter    shows the evolution of the exchange rate pass-through in 




Parameters    and  were estimated. The corresponding estimates are -0.0003 and 
0.0241324, respectively. The parameter 
The corresponding estimates are 
was taken from the Central Bank´s Model of 
Trasmission Mechanisms.   was calibrated at  0.006738, substantially lower than  . 
 
  Output-RER Elasticity: 
 
A time-varying coefficient is estimated that measures the evolution of the sensitivity of the 
output gap to the RER gap. The sample is made up by quarterly data from 1990-I to 2010-III. 
The estimation is based on the state-space representation of a system of two equations The 




 is the output gap,    es is the RER gap and   is the real interest rate gap. All variables 
are obtained from the Central Bank´s Model of Transmission Mechanisms.  
 
The time-varying parameter  shows the evolution of the response of the output gap to the 
RER gap. The evolution of this parameter is given by: 
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, 
 
Parameters   and   were calibrated at 0.0025 and 0.0656, respectively. The value of 
parameter  was taken from the Central Bank´s Model of Transmission Mechanisms. 
 
  Exchange Rate Volatility: 
 
For the calculation of the Nominal Exchange rate volatility we use daily data for the spot 
exchange rate (TRM) for the period 1996q4 – 2010q3. 
The formula of the quarterly volatility is: 
      
 
where   is the spot exchange rate of the i-th day of the quarter t,  T is the number of daily 
observations in the t quarter and   
   17 
Appendix 2 
 
Exchange Rate Flexibility Supports Exchange Rate Flexibility: A Simple Model 
 
 
The following model illustrates the possibility that low (high) exchange rate volatility generates 
the conditions in which the central bank optimal responses to exogenous shocks produce and 
validate low (high) exchange rate volatility. Specifically, if low exchange rate volatility induces 
a high pass-through from the exchange rate to prices, then the central bank will  optimally 
respond to exogenous shocks in a way that will involve low exchange rate volatility, thus 
supporting  the  persistence  of  a  high  pass-through.  Hence,  economies  may  end  up  being 
“trapped”  in  low  exchange  rate  volatility/high  pass-through  equilibria.  Conversely,  high 
exchange rate volatility may imply low pass through coefficients and may induce the central 
bank to optimally preserve a high exchange rate volatility regime in equilibrium. 
 
Suppose a simple open economy described by the following equations: 
 
         e y e y
E       Phillips Curve 
          ) ( ) (
_ _




i   IS Curve 
     ) (
* e e i i
E         UIP 
 
Foreign inflation is assumed to be zero. , , and  are uncorrelated supply, demand and 
external interest rate shocks, respectively. The output gap in the IS curve responds to a RER 
gap measured with respect to expected inflation. A rationale for this may be based on pre-
determined  nominal  wages  that  are  fixed  for  the  period  of  analysis,  so  that  a  nominal 
depreciation increases the production of net exports. The standard assumptions are made 
with respect to the signs of the coefficients:  0 , 0 , 0 , 0     e i e y y y   . 
 
The key parameter of this model is the response of inflation to the nominal exchange rate, e. 
According to the arguments presented in section 3, the less volatile the exchange rate, the 
larger  this  coefficient.  This  is  so  because  movements  in  the  exchange  rate  are  likely  to 
represent persistent shifts in nominal marginal costs (in the Phillips curve). In consequence, 
the pass-through coefficient is greater.  
 
Formally, defining e as the volatility of the exchange rate, the following relation is posited: 
 
  0 , 0     f f e e     (1) 
 
However, exchange rate volatility,  e, is itself an endogenous variable, determined by the 
volatility of the exogenous shocks, , , and , and the response of the central bank to 
them. Such response is found by assuming that the Central Bank discretionally chooses its 






   18 
In its optimization process, the central bank takes expectations of inflation and the exchange 
rate as given and is able to observe the exogenous supply, demand and foreign interest rate 
shocks.  Private  sector  expectations  are  assumed  to  be  formed  before  the  shocks  occur.  
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Or, in abbreviated terms: 
 











Here e(i) is the UIP equation:      
E e i i e
*   
 
The FONC for this problem is: 
 
      0      i e i i e i e i y e y y y e e y y      
 
Notice  that  ei  =  -1  and  define       0      e e i y e i y y y y K   .  The  FONC  may  then  be 
expressed as: 
0   y K      (2) 
 
The trade-off between inflation and output will depend on the pass-through coefficient, e. The 
greater the pass-through, the greater the marginal benefit of correcting an inflation deviation 
(from zero) through a movement in the interest rate, relative to the output marginal cost of 
such a move. As a result, the central bank is more willing to sacrifice output to correct the 
inflation deviation:  
      0
2     


e e i y e i
e




  (3) 
 
To obtain the optimal response of the central bank to exogenous shocks, totally differentiate 
first order condition (2): 
 
  
         
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e i e e i y
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          
        
          
          
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Define    0      e e i y y y K H    . Then the interest rate response to the shocks derived 
from (4) is: 
 

















     (5) 
 
The positive coefficients in equation (5) mean that the central bank will raise interest rate after 
a supply, demand or external interest rate shock. A supply shock (d > 0) increases inflation 
above zero and forces the central bank to accept a loss of output to stabilize inflation. A 
demand shock (d > 0) produces a deviation of both inflation and the output gap from zero. 
The central bank then increases interest rates to stabilize inflation and output. An external 
interest rate shock (d > 0) generates a depreciation of the currency that pushes inflation and 
the output gap away from zero, requiring a tightening response from the central bank. 
 
Integrating  equation  (5)  and  using  the  UIP  equation  (     
E e i i e
* ),  the  following 
expression for the equilibrium nominal exchange rate is obtained: 
 
 





















1 ~   (6) 
 
e ~  is the component of the equilibrium exchange rate that does not depend on the shocks. In 
particular,  because  of  the  assumption  about  the  timing  of  the  formation  of  expectations, 
neither inflation expectations nor expected exchange rates are affected by current shocks.  
Those expectations are included in e ~ . 
 
Following the reaction of nominal interest rates, the currency will appreciate in the face of 
supply and demand shocks (coefficients of  and  in equation (6) – recall that H<0). An 
external interest rate shock, , will cause a depreciation of the currency whose magnitude will 
be moderated by the response of the central bank (the coefficient of  in equation (6) is less 
than 1 because H<0). 
 
Furthermore,  assuming  that  future  expectations  of  inflation  or  the  exchange  rate  are  not 
influenced by current shocks (e.g. if shocks are not persistent), the variance of the exchange 
rate over long periods of time will depend only on the volatility of the shocks. From equation 
(6): 
 




























   (7) 
 
e is the variance of the nominal exchange rate and  ,   and  are the variances of the 
exogenous shocks. In equation (7) the coefficient of  has been simplified using the definition 
of    e e i y y y K H        .  The  pass-through  coefficient,  e,  has  an  impact  on  exchange 
rate volatility through its influence on the coefficients of the shock variances in equation (7):   20 
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, then inspection of the 
partial  derivatives  above  (equation  (8))  indicates  that  all  the  coefficients  will  respond 
negatively  to  an  increase  in  the  pass-through  coefficient,  e.  As  a  result,  exchange  rate 
volatility  will decline  with  pass-through.  From  the definition  of     e e i y y y K H        ,  it 
follows that: 
 
  1 1
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for low enough values of K. This follows from equations (8) and (9). 
 
Intuitively, an increase in the pass-through coefficient, e, has two effects on the monetary 
policy response to shocks. On the one hand, it requires a lower adjustment of the interest rate 
by the central bank in response to a shock that causes inflation to deviate from its optimal 
level. I.e. monetary policy is more powerful because of a larger pass-through and both the 
interest rate and the exchange rate (through the UIP) do not need to move much.  
 
On the other hand, a larger pass-through, e, reduces the importance of output gap in the 
inflation-output  trade-off,  K,  as  the  marginal  benefit  of  correcting  an  inflation  deviation  is 
greater (due to a larger impact of an interest rate move on inflation) relative to the output 
marginal cost. In consequence, the central bank is more willing to allow the interest rate to 
respond  strongly  to  shocks  that  move  inflation  and,  through  the  UIP,  produces  more 
exchange rate volatility.  
 
The second effect is more important, the greater the output weight, K. Hence, according to 






), when  is large enough or the pass-through coefficient, e, is very 
small,  an  increase  in  e  could  actually  increase  exchange  rate  volatility  (equation  (8)). 
Otherwise, there will be a negative relationship between exchange rate pass-through and 
exchange rate volatility because the first effect prevails.  
 
Nevertheless, low values of the preference weight parameter, , do not necessarily lead to a 
positive  relationship  between  pass-through  and  volatility.  Equation  (8)  shows  that  the 







.  Intuitively,  as  mentioned  above,  an  increase  in  pass-through  reduces  the 
importance of output in the central bank’s preferences (K falls). Since demand and external 
interest rate shocks shift output, the lower output weight means less incentives for the central 
bank to correct the shocks through interest rate (and exchange rate) movements. This effect 
is greater when  is large. Hence, it is possible that high values of   lead to a negative 
relationship  between  pass-though  and  exchange  rate  volatility.  Figure  A2-1  illustrates  the 
different configurations of this relationship for set of parameter values
8.  
 
                                                 
8 yi = -0.3, ye = 0.05, y = 0.1,  =  =  = 1.   22 
Figure A2-1 






















































Lambda = 0.25 Lambda = 1 Lambda = 0 (right axis)   
 
 
Hitherto  a  relationship  was  posited  in  which  the  pass-through  coefficient,  e,  depends  on 
exchange rate volatility, e (equation (1)). The smaller exchange rate volatility, the larger the 
response  of  local  prices  to  movements  in  the  exchange  rate,  for  the  latter  would  signal 
persistent shifts in marginal costs. At the same time, a relationship was established in which 
exchange rate volatility, e, depends on the pass-through coefficient, e (equation (7)). For 
high enough values of e in combination with appropriate values of ,  increases in the pass-
through coefficient will incentivize the central bank to deliver lower exchange rate volatility. 
This is so because greater pass-through coefficients make monetary policy more powerful 
and require smaller adjustments in the exchange rate in the face of exogenous shocks to 
inflation. Also, greater pass-through reduces the incentives for the central bank to correct 
output deviations caused by demand or external interest rate shocks. 
 
An equilibrium in this economy occurs when the exchange rate volatility, e, that produces the 
pass-through coefficient, e, in equation (1) coincides with the exchange rate volatility,  e, 
generated  by  the  pass-through  coefficient,  e,  in  equation  (7).  This  equation  includes  the 
fulfillment of the relationships that describe the economy (Phillips Curve, IS and UIP), as well 
as the optimizing behavior of the central bank. Formally then, the macroeconomic equilibrium 
is given by: 
 
  0 , 0     f f e e     (1)   23 
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Result # 2: 
Depending on the shapes of    e e f    (equation (1))  and    e e g    (equation (7)), there 
may be multiple pairs   e e   ,   that are macroeconomic equilibrium points.  Given the 
assumption of    0   e f  ,  some equilibria will display  higher pass-through and lower 
exchange rate volatility than others. 
 
In other words, there may be multiple equilibria. In some of them, economies with low 
exchange rate volatility will persistently display high pass-through and, consequently, central 
banks will deliver low exchange rate volatility. These cases may co-exist with economies in 
which high exchange rate volatility induces  low pass-through and, therefore, allows  the 
central bank to tolerate high exchange rate volatility in equilibrium. Figure A2-2 illustrates 
these situations for a specification of    e e f     and a set of parameter values
9. Points A and 
B correspond to equilibria with high exchange rate volatility and low pass-through. In contrast, 
an economy in point C has low exchange rate volatility and high pass-through in equilibrium. 
 
Finally, it is worth emphasizing that multiple equilibria are a possibility in this model. This is 
not necessarily the only outcome. Depending on the shapes of    e e f     and    e e g    , 
there may be situations with a unique equilibrium. 
 
Figure A2-2 










                                                 
9 The pass-through function is as follows: e  = 1 – 8.33 e . Other parameter values:  = 0.25, yi = -0.3, ye = 0.05, y = 















• Big Mac Indices: Yearly frequency. Two estimates: One with respect to the US and the other 
with respect to a (trade-weighted) basket of countries. Confidence intervals are constructed 
on the basis of the standard deviations of the difference between the NER and the Big Mac 
index measures. 
 
• Historical Averages for RER: Monthly frequency. We examine long run averages for the 
RER (since 1970) and allow for structural breaks (Perron and Yabu, 2009 test). Confidence 
intervals are constructed as explained above. 
  
Tradable/Non-Tradable  Relative  Price  Methodologies:  We  acknowledge  the  possibility  of 
large swings in the relative prices of tradable and non-tradable goods that may emerge as 
equilibrium  responses  to  policy  or  other  exogenous  shocks/trends  affecting  the  economy. 
Long  run  trends  and  international  comparisons  are  computed  to  evaluate  possible 
misalignments of the currency. 
 
•  Hodrick-Prescott  Filters:  Monthly  frequency.  Estimated  since  1970.  Confidence  intervals 
estimated as explained before. 
 
• “Penn Tables” Balassa-Samuelson effect: Yearly frequency. The following relationship is 
exploited: 
 
NERi / PPP-NERi  =  f (Per Capita GDPi / Per Capita GDP USA) 
 
for a cross-section of countries i, where the PP-NER is obtained from the IMF. According to 
the  Balassa-Samuelson  effect,  the  richer  the  country,  the  more  appreciated  its  currency 
should be in real terms. One could examine the misalignment of the currency after controlling 
for this effect. The confidence intervals in this case are obtained from the standard error of the 
regression. 
  
BEER Methodologies: Again, allowing for fluctuations of the relative price of tradable and non-
tradable goods, the behavior of the RER is modeled as a function of “fundamentals” obtained 
from conventional theory (net foreign assets, terms of trade, public consumption, productivity 
differentials,  income  of  trading  partners  etc).  Reduced  forms  are  estimated  and  used  to 
evaluate a possible misalignment of the RER, using confidence intervals: 
 
• SVEC: Structural VEC. Yearly frequency (based on Echavarría et al., 2007) 
 
• VEC: Quarterly frequency. 
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• “Smoothed” VEC:  Quarterly frequency. The cointegration vector obtained in the previous 
methodology is applied to Hodrick-Prescott-filtered series of the fundamentals (Mac Donald 
and Ricci, 2003). 
  
FEER Methodologies: The fundamental equilibrium exchange rate is defined as the one that 
results when the economy is in internal and external equilibrium. The latter occurs, in turn, 
when the current account deficit is at its long run level (Williamson, 1983). Following an IMF 
methodology, a “required RER adjustment” is calculated as: 
  
(CC* - CCtrend) / mtc 
  
CC* is the equilibrium level of the current account, CCtrend is the H-P trend of the current 
account and mtc is the elasticity of imports and exports with respect to the exchange rate. 
The definition of the equilibrium level of the current account may be arbitrary, but we use 
several measures: the average of the last X years, or the level that would leave the ratio net 
foreign  assets  /  GDP  unchanged,  given  some  assumptions  on  domestic  GDP  long  term 
growth and long run external inflation. 
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